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Underlying most arguments against the free market is a lack 
of belief in freedom itself. l 
I Introduction 
On May 7, 2002, three physicians filed a class action lawsuit 
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that shook American organized medicine to the core.2 The 
plaintiffs attacked a veritable institution that has been in place 
for over fifty years and which almost every single U.S. medical 
school graduate during this time has used to obtain placement 
in a graduate medical training program, or a residency. The 
subject of the lawsuit's attack was the National Resident Match-
ing Program ("NRMP"), also known as the "Match." The plain-
tiffs claimed that the NRMP together with accrediting 
organizations form a giant conspiracy designed to depress wages 
of individuals employed by residencies.3 The plaintiffs alleged 
that the fact that an average salary of a resident hovers around 
$40,000, irrespective of the region or specialty, indirectly proves 
the agreement to stabilize wages.4 The plaintiffs asked for treble 
damages, but most importantly, for an injunction against the fu-
ture operation of the Match.s 
The named defendants were sufficiently alarmed by the liti-
gation and sought a legislative answer. On April 10, 2004, nearly 
two years after the litigation commenced, the President signed 
into law the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004,6 which pro-
vided the NRMP and the institutions participating in the Match 
with a blanket antitrust exemption except as to direct price fix-
ing. 7 In this Act, Congress made findings that the Match is a 
"highly efficient, pro-competitive" process.s The District Court, 
relying on this statute, subsequently dismissed the suit.9 
This article focuses on the NRMP system and argues that 
the process is neither efficient nor pro-competitive. This article 
argues that Congress erred in bestowing an antitrust exemption 
on the NRMP and the participating institutions. 
This article suggests that although the system may have 
been necessary to check the problem of early recruiting that was 
2 Jung v. AAMC, No. CIVA02-0873 PLF, 2004 \\'1. 1803198 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 
2004). 
3 Jung v. AAMC, Plaintifft' Class Action Complaint at 5-6, available at http://www. 
savethematch.org/pdf/complaint.pdf (last visited Sept. 13,2004) [hereinafter Plaintiffs 
Class Action complaint]. 
4 Id. at 30-3l. 
sId. at 33-34. 
6 Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, 118 Stat. 596 (2004) 
[hereinafter Pension Funding Equity Act]. 
7 Id. § 207(b)(2)-(3). 
8 Id. § 207(a)(1) (E). 
9 See supra note 2, at 29. 
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pervasive in the 1950s (similar to the one that plagued the fed-
eraljudiciary until just two years ago), the system has oudived its 
usefulness. Part II will explain the Match's history and function 
and will discuss how the system makes participation in the Match 
inevitable and required. Part III will focus on the economic 
analysis of the system. It will argue that the Match abolishes the 
students' ability to bargain by preventing students from receiving 
several offers of employment. This section will explain that al-
though the student participating in the Match may receive his 
most preferred choice, his lack of ability to negotiate salary and 
benefits precludes him from making a proper judgment as to 
which choice he truly most prefers. Part III will also analyze the 
procompetitive justifications put forth by the Match proponents 
and will conclude that these stated benefits are ephemeral. 
Part IV will focus on the analysis of relevant case law. The 
caselaw is useful to this analysis, even though it is moot in light of 
the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, as it suggests that the 
NRMP's conduct has been viewed as anticompetitive for quite 
some time, notwithstanding congressional findings. In the next 
part, the article examines several alternatives to the NRMP and 
concludes that a free market system, limited only by defined 
dates of entry and exit from the market, is the appropriate mech-
anism by which medical students should select their residencies. 
This part argues that other systems, such as allowing students to 
match into multiple places only alleviate, but do not solve, the 
problem raised by Part III. Further, Part V argues that any sys-
tem other than the free market will wreak havoc on the resi-
dency programs by potentially causing them to over- or under-
enroll residents. The article's conclusion is in Part VI. 
II. History and Operation of the NRMP 
A graduate of a United States medical school obtains his 
Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) degree upon completion of the req-
uisite curriculum of study at that school. 10 The M.D. degree in 
10 See, e.g., STATE UNlV. OF N.Y. AT STONY BROOK, SCH. OF l\1ED., Policies & Procedures 
Manual, available at http://www.hsc.stonybrook.edu/som/policy2/index.cfm (last vis-
ited May 4, 2004) (listing degree requirements including four years of study and pas-
sage of USMLE Steps 1 & 2 (licensing exams»; STANFORD UNIY., SCH. OF Mm., 
Requirements for Graduatian, available at http://med.stanford.edu/md/curriculum/re-
quirements.html (last visited May 4, 2004) (same); BAYLOR COLL. OF Mm., Requirements 
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and of itself, however, does not permit its holder to practice the 
art of medicine. In all fifty states and the District of Columbia, 
the holder of the M.D. degree is required to pass several licens-
ing exams and complete from one to three years of post-gradu-
ate medical studies. 11 These studies are commonly known as an 
internship or a residency. During the course of these post-grad-
uate studies a physician acquires his specialty. 
A. The History of the Match 
Internships were introduced to American medical educa-
tion at the turn of the 20th century.12 Internships provided an 
opportunity for interns to finally train in clinical medicine after 
four years of theoretical practice and observation. Hospitals ben-
efited from the cheap labor provided by the interns. 13 Both 
then and now, the number of residency positions exceeded the 
number of U.S. graduates applying for such positions. 14 
Because the supply of positions originally exceeded demand 
for them, hospitals utilized several mechanisms to secure top 
ranked students. IS One of the means used by hospitals to recruit 
the most desirable applicants was to make offers to these stu-
dents earlier than other hospitals.16 Such ploys quickly resulted 
in the forward creep of the appointment date. 17 The situation 
quickly became quite absurd. Students started receiving offers 
during their second year of medical studies,18 long before they 
had seen a patient or worked in any clinical department. 19 AJ-
for the Degree Doctor of Medicine, available at Imp:! /www.bcm.edu/osa/handbook/doc-
tor_degree.html (last visited May 4,2004) (same). 
II See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, §§ 1315,1321,1328 (2004); 22 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE § 163.2 (2004); N.V. CaMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 60.1 (2004). 
12 See Alvin Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A 
Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991, 992 (1984). 
13Id. 
14 At the present time, however, the overall number of applicants exceeds the 
number of positions. This is so because there is a large number of foreign trained 
physicians who are also vying for residencies. See NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, 
Advanced Data Tables for 2004 Residency Match at 2-3, available at http://www.nrmp.org/ 
2004advdata.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004) (stating that in 2004 there were a total of 
21,192 first-year positions offered through the Match and 25,246 active applicants of 
whom only 14,609 were U.S. medical students) (hereinafter "NRMP, Data Tables"). 
15 Roth, supra note 12, at 992-93. 
16 Id. at 993. 
17 Id. at 993-94. 
18 Id. at 994. 
19 The medical school curriculum is subdivided into clinical and pre-clinical years. 
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though all the institutional participants in post-graduate medical 
education recognized the problem, none were able or willing to 
stop the forward creep.20 The offers extended by these hospitals 
were often good for just a few hours.21 As a result, students had 
to decide very quickly, prior to even deciding on their field of 
practice, whether or not to accept a given hospital'S offer. Al-
though, given the surplus of positions, a student could be as-
sured of finding one at virtually any time, the highly coveted 
positions did not remain available for long, resulting in pressure 
to accept the first offer that the student received.22 
Eventually, the hospitals realized that the early appointment 
date was impractical for both them and the students, and conse-
quently, they set out to find a solution. In 1945, medical schools 
agreed to embargo all of the academic information about stu-
dents until the end of the third year of studies.23 Schools abided 
by this agreement and the problem of early appointments was 
largely resolved.24 However, the students were still faced with 
the problem of "exploding" offers, i.e., offers that were good 
only for a limited time. 25 A student who was accepted into a 
second or third choice hospital, but was waitlisted by a more pre-
ferred program essentially had to gamble. 26 He could either 
take the less preferred position and forego the chance to do resi-
dency in a more desired location or give up the less desired posi-
tion in hopes to be taken off the waitlist in the hospital that he 
most preferred. Of course, a student could accept a less pre-
ferred position and then break the commitment, but such be-
havior was considered unprofessional, and therefore, not truly 
an option.27 
Hospitals attempted to find several mechanisms to deal with 
the "optimization" problem described above. First, hospitals 
agreed that an offer to a student would remain open for ten 
The first two years involve pre-clinical classroom instruction in subjects like Biochemis-
try, Anatomy, Pharmacology, etc. The last two years involve students spending several 
weeks in various hospital departments (e.g., Surgery, Internal Medicine, Obstetrics, etc). 
20 Roth, supra note 12, at 993-94. 
21 ld. at 994-95. 
22 See id. at 994. 
23 ld. 
241d. 
25 Roth, supra note 12, at 994. 
26 ld. 
27 See id. 
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days.28 This would enable a student to contact more desired pro-
grams in an attempt to secure an offer from them without the 
fear of losing the offer already made. Eventually, however, the 
hospitals attempted to shorten the period during which the offer 
was left open. By 1949, a twelve hour period was rejected as too 
long.29 The appointment day began at 12:01 A.M., and the hos-
pitals could demand answers within minutes.3o A centralized 
matching system was implemented in order to avoid this mid-
night madness. Hospitals and students would still make individ-
ual contacts (e.g., applications, interviews); however, hospitals 
would submit a list of their preferred candidates and applicants 
would submit a list of their preferred hospitals to the centralized 
agency.3] This centralized agency would then "match" students 
and hospitals. This was the birth of the National Resident 
Matching Program. 
B. The Operations of the NRJ'vlP 
Over eighty percent of all first year residencies are offered 
through the NRMP.32 A vast majority of graduating U.S. medical 
students sign up with the program.33 The participation of either 
hospitals or students, however, is not completely voluntary. Hos-
pitals are strongly encouraged to participate in the Match by the 
residency accrediting body, the Accreditation Commission on 
Graduate Medical Education ("ACGME").34 Many medical 
schools require their students to sign contracts with the NRMP.35 
28 Id. at 994-95. 
29 Id. at 995. 
30 Roth, supra note 12, at 995. 
31 Id. 
32 Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint, supra note 3, at 23. 
33 Melinda Creasman, Resuscitating the National Resident Matching Program: Improving 
Medical Resident Placement through Binding Dual Matching, 56 VAND. 1. REv. 1439, 1444 
(2003). 
34 See ACGME, Institutional Requirements I1I.A.2.b., available at http://www.acgme. 
org (last visited May 5, 2004) ("In selecting from among qualified applicants, it is 
strongly suggested that the Sponsoring Institution and all of its ACGME-accredited programs 
participate in an organized matching program, such as the National Resident Matching Pro-
gram (NRMP), where such is available" (emphasis added». 
A hospital effectively cannot run a residency program without the ACGME accredi-
tation. Without such accreditation, a hospital cannot receive federal moneys for resi-
dent training, nor can the graduates of unaccredited programs qualifY for licensure in 
any U.S. state. 
35 See, e.g., STATE UNIV. OF NY. AT STONY BROOK, SCH. OF MEn., The Internship Quest, 
available at http://www.uhmc.sunysb.edu/som/academics/FourthYear/intemsh.html 
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Even if the medical school imposes no such requirement, stu-
dents who do not sign with the NRMP risk being unable to inter-
view for employment in any residency program. 
In the summer of the fourth year of medical school, stu-
dents begin applying to various residency programs.36 As men-
tioned previously, the vast majority of these programs participate 
in the NRMP. 37 The NRMP contract bars the participating pro-
grams from offering any available slots outside the Match pro-
cess.38 Thus, a student who chooses to forgo the Match also 
automatically forgoes any opportunity to obtain a spot in a par-
ticipating program. Once a student chooses to participate in the 
Match, he signs an agreement with the NRMP whereby he agrees 
(1) to not seek positions outside of the Match process39 and (2) 
to abide by the results of the Match process.40 
At about the same time that the student signs an agreement 
with the NRMP, he submits applications to various hospitals.41 
These hospitals, in turn, decide whether to interview the stu-
dent. Mter the interviews are completed, the student submits a 
preference-ordered list (a "rank order list" or "ROL") of hospi-
tals to the NRMp42 and the hospitals submit an ROL of students 
that they interviewed.43 Beginning in approximately mid-Febru-
ary and lasting through mid-March, the NRMP utilizes a compli-
(last visited May 4,2004) ("All students who expect to graduate must enter the Match." 
(emphasis added). 
36 See id. at Table I, available at http://www.uhmc.sunysb.edu/som/academics/ 
FourthYear/timeline.html (last visited May 5,2004) (specifying that applications to pro-
grams are to be sent between July and August of the senior year). 
37 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
38 NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, Match Participation Agreement for Applicants 
and Programs § 6.0, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/policies/map_main. 
html#match_commit (last visited May 5, 2004) ("It is a material breach of this Agree-
ment for a participant in the Matching Program to make any verbal or written contract 
for appointment to a concurrent year residency position prior to the Matching Pro-
gram") [hereinafter NRMP, Agreement for Applicants & Programs]. 
39 [d. 
40 [d. § 5.1. ("The listing of an applicant by a program on its certified rank order 
list or of a program by an applicant on the applicant's certified rank order list estab-
lishes a binding commitment to offer or to accept an appointment if a match results 
.... Failure to honor this commitment by either party participating in a match will be a 
material breach of this Agreement and may result in penalties .... ") 
41 See Save the Match: How the Match Works http://www.savethematch.org/history/ 
howworks.aspx# (last visited May 5, 2004) ("Applicants must apply directly to programs 
in addition to registering for the NRMP's matching service.") [hereinafter How the 
Match Works]. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
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cated algorithm to match students' and hospitals' preferences.44 
Students who do not match receive notice two to three days ear-
lier than the general release of the Match results, along with a 
list of unmatched hospitals spots.45 These students can then di-
rectly call these institutions to obtain a position in a process aptly 
named "the Scramble." Only students who have participated in 
the Match are allowed access to the list of unmatched hospital 
programs during the period preceding notice of the match re-
sults.46 Thus, studen ts who choose to forgo the Match cannot 
Scramble until the complete Match results are released.47 Fi-
nally, in mid- to late-March, students receive the results of the 
Match on a day known as the "Match Day," and are bound to 
accept that result. 48 On that day, the non-participating students 
also can attempt to secure whatever spots remain unfilled. 
In order to prevent violations of the agreement (both pre-
and post-Match Day), the NRMP threatens and does punish vio-
lators. Students who are found to violate the Match agreement 
are reported to their medical school deans, to the American 
Board of Medical Specialties,49 and to the directors of the pro-
grams that have hired the applicant.50 Upon learning of the 
Match violation, a medical school dean presumably can apply 
disciplinary measures to the student and the program director 
may dismiss an applicant from the program.51 Furthermore, the 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
4fi See http://www.savethematch.org/history/howworks.aspx# (last visited May 5, 
2004). ("Access to these lists is restricted to Match participants.") 
47 Id. 
48 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
49 The ABMS is an umbrella organization of various specialty Boards. Specialty 
Boards are responsible for administering exams to verifY physicians' competence in a 
given specialty. Upon passing these exams a physician can become Board certified. 
Although Board certification has no impact on licensure, it has a direct impact on the 
potential earnings. Thus, if ABMS chooses to usc the Match violation as a bar to ob-
taining Board certification, such an action can dramatically affect the future financial 
fortunes of the violator. 
50 This, of course, is relevant only if the director of the program did not know of 
the applicant's status as a violator. This could occur if an applicant matches to program 
A, but forgoes that offer, and obtains employment with program B, while not telling 
that program that he has matched somewhere else. See NRMP, Agreementfor Applicants 
& Programs, supra note 38, § 7.2.1. 
51 Although the NRMP Agreement is not specific on what other consequences can 
befall a student, it does state that aggrieved participants can resort to other remedies 
beyond the penalties imposed by the NRMP. See NRMP, Agreement for Applicants & Pro-
grams § 7.3. Furthermore, it would be quite pointless to notifY the Dean of the medical 
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NRMP reserves the right to ban student violators from the Match 
process for up to three years.52 Given the fact that participation 
in the Match is almost obligatory if one is serious about securing 
a residency, a bar on the participation can potentially bar an in-
dividual from becoming a licensed physician for up to three 
years. 
The penalties against hospitals that violate the Match agree-
ment are slightly less severe. The violator residency program 
may be identified as such on the NRMP website for up to three 
years post-violation.5~ Presumably, this identification would dis-
courage students from ranking the program highly. Violations 
discovered prior to the Match day may result in the NRMP re-
moving the residency program from the Match.54 This removal 
would result in the program not receiving any of the applicants 
it has interviewed because those applicants would match to other 
hospitals. Finally, and most importantly, violator programs are 
referred to ACGME. 55 The status as a violator can presumably 
affect the accreditation process, for although ACGME doesn't 
require participation in the Match, it strongly encourages partic-
ipation as part of the accreditation guidelines.56 
Additionally, the NRMP takes a very broad view of the term 
"violations." Under the NRMP rules, not only are the programs 
and applicants forbidden from signing a contract prior to the 
Match,57 but they are also forbidden from enticing each other 
into ranking them higher on the rank order list. The programs 
and applicants are forbidden from even asking one another 
about how they plan to rank each other.58 Thus, an applicant is 
essentially prevented from bargaining with the program for em-
ployment conditions prior to the release of the Match results. 
In addition to the above mechanisms at its disposal, starting 
in 2004, the NRMP has implemented an additional requirement, 
school and! or a residency program director if these officials were powerless to take any 
action. 
521d. 
53 Id. § 7.2.2. 
54 ld. 
551d. 
56 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
57 NRMP, Agreement for Applicants & Programs, supra note 38. § 7.1. 
58 ld. § 6.0. (UIn addition, although applicants or programs may volunteer how 
they plan to rank each other, it is a material breach of this Agreement to request such 
information.") 
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known as the "all-or-nothing" rule. Previously, in a hospital with 
several residency programs (e.g., one in Pediatrics, one in Sur-
gery, etc.), some of the programs could have chosen to partici-
pate in the Match, while others, typically smaller programs, may 
have chosen to opt OUt.59 Moreover, a program that intended to 
hire more than one resident did not have to offer all of its availa-
ble slots through the Match.60 In order to avoid this dual track, 
the NRMP has implemented a new rule that requires the entire 
institution to either be in or out of the Match.61 Under this rule, 
an individual residency program in a given hospital would no 
longer be able to opt out of the Match. This new rule is likely to 
increase the number of participating residency programs above 
eighty percent, thus even further limiting the choice for students 
who may want to opt out of the Match. 
III. Economic Analysis oj the Match 
A. The Anticompetitive Effects 
In their complaint, the plaintiffs in Jung claim that the 
NRMP system "has the purpose and effect of depressing, stan-
dardizing and stabilizing compensation and other terms of em-
ployment."62 This part argues that this allegation is indeed 
correct because, by the virtue of having students locked into the 
one-offer mode, the NRMP prevents hospitals and students from 
negotiating terms of employment. In order to understand how 
59 However, most programs do participate in the Match because of the ACGME's 
"encouragement. " 
60 Indeed the program is allowed to change the number ofspot~ available through 
the NRMP until end of January. See NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, 2004 Main 
Match Schedule, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/yearly.html(last visited 
May 5, 2004). However, even if the program withdraws slots, it is not allowed to offer 
these slots to U.S. medical students who participate in the Match. (The program can 
offer them to foreign-trained physicians who participate in the Match.) 
61 See NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, "'latch Participation Agreement for Institu-
tions § 4.2, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/policies/map_institution.htrnl 
(last visited Aug 16, 2004) ("The institution agrees that all of its programs eligible for 
participation in the Matching Program ,,~Il select senior students of U.S. allopathic 
medical schools only through the Matching Program, or another national matching 
plan. If any position is offered to U.S. allopathic students outside the Matching Pro-
gram or another national matching plan, including a preliminary position for a pro-
gram that participates in another national matching plan, the institution and the 
program will be in material breach .... ") (Some specialties (e.g., ophthalmology, urol-
ogy, and otolaryngology) have their own separate matching programs that operate in a 
manner identical to the NRMP.) 
62 Plaintifft' Class Action Complaint, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
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this one-offer system standardizes and depresses wages, one must 
first understand how the residency programs are funded. 
Hospitals that run accredited medical programs are com-
pensated for training residents. The revenue comes in two dis-
tinct streams.63 One revenue stream is the direct subsidy from 
Medicare, whereby the hospital receives a certain amount of dol-
lars per resident per year. 64 Although the formula for determin-
ing how much a hospital is entitled to for training a particular 
resident is quite complex,6!,) generally speaking, a hospital re-
ceives an equal sum for every resident it trains no matter what 
specialty that resident pursues.66 This stream of revenue is 
known as Direct Graduate Medical Education ("DGME") Pay-
ments.57 Hospitals also receive what is known as Indirect Medi-
cal Education ("IME") payments.58 These are additional 
payments by Medicare for the services that the resident provides 
to Medicare beneficiaries. In short, hospitals receive significant 
amounts of money for training residents. 69 
Although the hospitals do receive significant amounts of 
money for training residents, the DGME portion is quite stable, 
and is, by and large, the same for all residents. The IME portion 
depends on the procedures performed on Medicare patients 
and the resident-ta-patient ratio in a given hospital. Hospitals 
rely on these payments when determining a resident's salary. 
These, however, are not the only funds hospitals receive for 
training residents. As with any other service, hospitals bill for, 
and receive payments for services rendered by the residents.70 
Further, although the federal government pays a hospital 
roughly the same amount of money per resident per year, fed-
63 CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, Medicare and Graduate Medical Education at ix (Sept. 
1995), available at ftp:! /ftp.cbo.gov/Oxx/doc17/Gradmede.pdf (last visited May 7, 
2004). 
64 ld. 
65 Richard M. Knapp, Complexity and Uncertainty in Financing Graduate Medical Edu-
cation, 77 ACAD. MED. 1076, 1077 (2002). 
fifi See id. Note that the amounts are the same across programs within the hospital 
but may val)' between different hospitals. 
671d. 
68 ld. at lO79-80. 
69 The IME & DGME payments in FY 2002 totaled almost $9 billion dollars. See id. 
70 See HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND 
PUBLIC POLICY; A PRIMER 6 (2000) ("Graduate medical education has largely been 
funded from patient care income of teaching hospitals .... "), available at ftp:!/ 
ftp.hrsa.gov/bhpr/nationalcenter/GMEprimeLpdf. 
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eral law does not require hospitals to divide the money equally 
among residents. Thus, hospitals can use money they receive 
from the government for one resident to pay the salary of an-
other. Additionally, hospitals can use other streams of revenue 
to pay higher salaries to those residents that they deem desira-
ble. Finally, even if we are to assume that hospitals cannot vary 
salaries (an assumption that this author explicitly rejects), hospi-
tals may vary employment conditions (e.g., duty hours) betw"een 
those residents that it deems more or less desirable. Yet, cur-
rently hospitals do none of these things. The reason for such 
uniformity is the Match. The Match enables hospitals to set uni-
form salaries and uniform working conditions by restraining 
competition between hospitals for top medical students and be-
tween medical students for top hospitals. 
In the market for medical schools, or the market for post-
residency jobs, an applicant can hold multiple offers. (Indeed 
this is true for nearly all school or job markets.) Having several 
offers in hand, an applicant can then bargain with employers (or 
schools) regarding the salary or other conditions of employment 
(or education). Further, when an applicant has one non-bind-
ing offer, he can use it as leverage with other potential employ-
ers. Thus, an applicant with offers from more prestigious 
Employer A and less prestigious Employer B can approach the 
latter employer and propose working for him on the condition 
that the salary and benefits would exceed that of the former em-
ployer. If Employer B is truly interested in hiring this applicant, 
he would be enticed into outbidding Employer A in hopes that 
the difference in salary, benefits and/or conditions of employ-
ment would make up for the lower prestige. 
Conversely, in a multiple offer system, a less desirable appli-
cant would be able to approach the more prestigious Employer 
A and suggest that he is willing to take a pay cut if the employer 
would hire him. Alternatively, an employer who may be looking 
to save money can propose to hire a less prestigious applicant on 
the condition that he would take less money or work more 
hours. 
The Match forecloses both possibilities. Under the Match 
system, a student cannot receive multiple offers. Consequently, 
an applicant cannot use one offer as leverage to obtain either a 
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more prestigious position or to bargain for better terms of em-
ployment with an equally or less prestigious hospital. The fact 
that during the application and interview process applicants can 
compare different employment contracts and rank programs ac-
cordingly does not mitigate the problem. An applicant can most 
certainly rank programs based on salary, prestige, or both. How-
ever, a given applicant does not know how many programs are 
actually willing to extend an offer to him, therefore, he is in no 
position to leverage his marketability. Further, because the 
Match rules forbid applicants and programs from making 
promises in an attempt to affect how both parties rank each 
other, any negotiations that could theoretically occur between a 
program and an applicant would either violate the Match agree-
ment (with the concomitant consequences) or would be com-
pletely irrelevant, as there would be no way to assure that the 
negotiations would in the end bear any fruit. 
An additional problem occurs with a single binding offer 
system, such as the Match. The Match's single offer mechanism 
also prevents a student from receiving offers in multiple special-
ties. Currently, a hospital pays its residents the same rate, re-
gardless of their specialty.71 Thus, for example, a second-year 
Internal Medicine resident at the New York Presbyterian Hospi-
tal earns the same amount as a second year Neurosurgery resi-
dent or a second-year Radiology resident, despite the fact that 
the potential future earnings of each specialty differ. 72 A stu-
71 Compare compensation for second year resident in Neurosurgery in New York 
Presbyterian Hospital (Cornell Campus) Program ($47,487) (http://www.ama-assn. 
org/vapp/freida/pgm/0,1238,1603521052,00.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004», with 
compensation for second year resident in Internal Medicine at the same hospital 
($45,661) (http://www.ama-assn.org/vapp/freida/pgm/O, 1238, 1403521270,00.html 
(last visited Sept. 13,2004». (The reason second-year residents are compared is the 
fact that Neurosurgery requires a preliminary year of post-graduate training. Thus, a 
first-year neurosurgery resident is actually in his second year of training). The salary is 
identical despite the fact that Internal Medicine is only a three-year program while Neu-
rosurgery is a six-year program, despite the fact that a Neurosurgery residency is signifi-
cantly more difficult to obtain, and despite the fact that once they complete the 
residency and enter private practice, Neurosurgeons ,,~11 likely earn significantly more 
than Family Practitioners. To compare competitiveness of various specialties, see NRMP, 
Data Tables, supra note 14 at Table 5 (specif)~ng that out of 4,751 Internal Medicine 
positions only 2,602 were filled by U.S. medical graduates and 124 positions remained 
unfilled, while for Neurosurgery out of 144 positions 119 were filled by U.S. medical 
students with only two remaining unfilled). 
72 For comparisons of average earnings in various medical specialties see Physi-
cians Search, First Year Starting Salary -National Average, available at http://www.physi 
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dent who can hold offers from both specialties can bargain with 
the Internal Medicine program for a higher salary and, should 
he get it, he would be free to evaluate whether or not a higher 
salary during residency years is worth the lower future salary. A 
student who cannot hold multiple offers is prevented from en-
gaging in such bargaining and evaluation of future earnings. 
This situation thus allows a given hospital to pay all residents the 
same regardless of the competitiveness of the program or the 
differences in the future earnings in the respective specialties. 
The NRMP rules thus prevent highly marketable students 
from obtaining the true value of their services. The rules also 
prevent less marketable students from attempting to secure a po-
sition by underbidding their competitors. Futher, applicants 
cannot compare offers from various specialties to make a deci-
sion whether to enroll in a more competitive specialty with a 
lower salary but higher potential lifetime earnings, or in a less 
competitive specialty with a higher salary but lower lifetime 
earnings. 
Proponents of the Match argue that the Match does not af-
fect salaries 73 and point to an article by Muriel Niederle and Al-
vin Roth 74 to bolster their claim. The Niederle and Roth article 
investigated the salaries of gastroenterology ("CI") fellows when 
the Match existed for this subspecialty75 and when the Match was 
abandoned. The article also compared the salaries of other In-
ternal Medicine subspecialties, some of which do, and some of 
which do not, utilize the Match. The article concludes that the 
salary remained the same, both in the presence and absence of 
cianssearch.com/physician/salaryl.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004), and Physicians 
Search, Physician Compensation Suroey -In Practice Three Plus Years, available at http://www. 
physicianssearch.com/physician/salary2.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). Note that the 
average starting salary of a neurosurgeon is almost 50% higher than that of an internist 
($185,000 versus $128,000). The average salary of a neurosurgeon that has been prac-
ticing for over three years is almost 300% higher than that of an internist in practice for 
over three years ($438,000 versus $160,000). Yet, while one is a resident the salary is 
identical for neurosurgeons and internists. 
73 Save the Match: FAQ, at http://www.savethematch.org!faq/all.aspx#q320872605 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004). ("The Match has no involvement whatsoever in setting 
resident stipends .... ") 
74 Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, What Are The Effects of a Match? Evidence from 
Internal Medicine, available at hup:! !www.stanford.edu!-niederle!Effects.of.a.Match.pdf 
(last visited May 9, 2004). 
75 GI fellowships are not residency programs, rather they are post-residency sub-
specialization programs. See infra note 89. 
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the Match. 76 The study, however, is flawed. Fellows' salaries are 
often based on residents' salaries (hospitals consider fellowships 
as additional post-graduate training and compensate accord-
ingly).77 The subspecialty investigated by Niederle and Roth is 
relatively small and narrow,78 and the salaries within that sub-
specialty are essentially tied to the salaries paid to the residents 
(which in turn are affected by the Match). Because of the above 
two facts the presence or absence of the Match within an isolated 
subspecialty is unlikely to have any effect on the salaries within 
that subspecialty, so long as the Match pervades the remainder 
of the process. 
Further, the Match involves significant transactional costs.79 
Because hospitals cannot quickly choose their most desired stu-
dents, they are forced to interview more people than they would 
in the absence of the Match.80 The hospitals interview more 
people because they are not sure who would actually match into 
their programs.81 The applicants also suffer transactional costs. 
The increase in the number of interviews conducted by hospitals 
increases the costs (e.g., travel, lodging) for applicants.82 The 
late appointment date creates feelings of stress and uncertainty 
and also precludes applicants from making timely arrangements 
for life beyond medical schoo1.83 This of course also impacts ap-
plicants' spouses and families who too must wait and speculate 
about their future. 84 
76 Niederle & Roth, supra note 74. 
77 See, e.g., FREIDA Online Program Information SUNY at Stony Brook Program (specify-
ing that the first year of a GI fellowship (available after three years of Internal Medicine 
training) is treated as "Graduate Year 4"), available at http://www.ama-a~sn.org/vapp/ 
freida/pgm/0,1238,1443521012,00.html (last visited May 9,2004). Note that the salary 
for a first year GI fellow (i.e., a person in "Graduate Year 4") is exactly the same as a 
salary fur a fourth year Surgery resident (available at http://www.ama-assn.org/vapp/ 
freida/pgm/0,1238,4403521242,00.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004», despite the fact 
that the former has completed a full residency training and now undergoing sub-spe-
cialization, while the latter is barely half-way through his primary specialty residency 
training. 
78 There are only 357 GI fellows per year nationwide. Niederle & Roth, supra note 
74 at 5. Indeed there are only 3,288 fellowship positions within internal medicine. Id. 
In contrast, there are 21,192 first-year residency positions. See Roth, supra note 12. 
79 Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Judicial Clerk Selection 
Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 CEO. L. J. 1749, 1766 (1995). 
80 Id. at 1767. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1767-68. 
83 Id. at 1772. 
84 Clark, supra note 79, at 1772. 
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B. The PTOcompetitive justifications and their Refutation 
The proponents of the Match argue that the current system 
has several pro-competitive qualities. In passing the Pension 
Funding Equity Act of 2004,85 Congress agreed with the Match's 
proponents and found the Match to be a "highly efficient, pro-
competitive" process.86 This section examines the arguments ad-
vanced by the Match's proponents and accepted by Congress, 
and concludes that these arguments are not convincing. 
The NRMP claims that the Match is procompetitive because 
it allows students to (1) "[c]ompletely and thoroughly evaluate 
each program they are considering without the pressure of early 
'exploding offers;'" (2) "[d]elay making their final decisions un-
til after they've had more clinical experience on which to base 
their choices;" and (3) "[c]ompete based on merit rather than 
influence."87 We will look at these arguments in turn. 
The Match process does indeed ensure that students are not 
faced with "exploding offers." It is, however, questionable 
whether the prevention of exploding offers is indeed pro-
competitive. 
First, it is altogether unclear to this author whether the ex-
ploding offer is a real or is merely a strawman argument. For 
example, neither colleges nor medical schools employ explod-
ing offers when recruiting students.88 It is unclear why residency 
programs would utilize such a tactic. Further, this author has 
85 Pension Funding Equity Act, supra note 6. 
86 Id. ~ 207(a)(1) (E). 
87 Save the Match FAQ at http://www.savethemalch.org/faq/all.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2004). The NRMP advances two additional reasons, namely that the Match 
allows students to "[rJank programs in accordancc with the students' true preferences, 
without having to worry about whether a program's interest in them is genuine or not 
or prejudicing their ability to secure a position at one of their 'safe' choices;" and to 
"[t]ry to get into the best programs in the specialty they wish to practice, without preju-
dicing their ability to secure a position at one of their 'safe' choices." The last argu-
men t is essentially a repetition of the very first one advanced. The second to last 
argument is a non sequitur. The ability to rank programs is neither pro- nor anticompe-
titive. To the extent that this argument advances the position that the Match allows 
students to explore more preferred options without fear that the "safe" choices would 
fill-up with other applicants \~a the use of exploding offers, this argument is dealt with 
when addressing NRMP's first claim of procompetitive effects. 
88 See, e.g., AM. Assoc. OF MED. COLLEGES, Recommendations Concerning Medical 
School Acceptance Procedures for First-Year Entering Students, available at http://www.aamc. 
org/students/applying/policies/admissionofficers.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). 
("Prior to May 15 of the year of matriculation, an applicant should be given at least two 
weeks to reply to an offer of admission") (emphasis added). 
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not been able to find any evidence of exploding offers in medi-
cal fellowships.so If the exploding offer is truly a problem, one 
would expect it to occur in fellowships that do not participate in 
the Match. Yet, this problem does not arise. This leads one to 
conclude that even with the elimination of the Match, exploding 
offers will not become a serious problem. 
Second, even assuming that exploding offers will make their 
return in the absence of the Match, it is debatable whether 
NRMP's way of eliminating this eventuality is procompetitive. 
The problem with this is that Match benefits are not evenly dis-
tributed between hospitals and students. The hospitals who seek 
the most qualified applicants benefit from the Match because 
they are assured that these applicants would not be seized 
early.90 The second-tier hospitals, on the other hand, lose be-
cause, in the absence of the Match, they could have obtained 
more desirable residents by enticing them to commit early.91 It 
is questionable whether applicants actually enjoy any benefit at 
all in this system. Although the most sought after applicants 
gain in the Match system because they have an opportunity to 
weigh different options and make their true choice, they lose 
because they cannot parlay their marketability into either an 
early secure offer (thus decreasing their stress) or multiple offers 
that can be used as leverage. On the one hand, the less desirable 
applicants benefit because the most desirable slots are not 
quickly taken by the best applicants. On the other hand, these 
applicants lose because they cannot compensate for their rela-
tive lack of marketability by making an early commitment to the 
hospital and thus saving that hospital money on the additional 
search. 
89 Fellowships are programs where a physician who has completed training can 
obtain additional training in a subspecialty. For example, after completing a Radiology 
residency, a physician may choose to pursue a Pediatric radiology fellowship. Fellow-
ships are run similar to residency programs, and fellows' compensation is significantly 
lower than that of practicing physicians. Although some fellowships participate in the 
Fellowship Match, most do not. The NRMP currently provides matching services to 
only 35 fellowship subspecialties. For a list of fellowship subspecialties participating in 
the NRMP see http://www.nrmp.org/fellow/index.html (last visited May 7, 2004). 
90 See Clark, supra note 79, at 1772-73 (arguing that a matching system similar to 
the NRMP if implemented for the federal judiciary would primarily benefit the judges 
interested only in the top-notch applicants). The same logic applies to the Match in the 
context of selecting a residency. 
91 Srr id. 
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The second argument put forth by the defenders of the 
Match is that the program prevents the creep in the timeline 
that was experienced before the Match. This argument is flawed 
because the Match was not the mechanism that solved the for-
ward creep in the appointment dates. That problem was solved 
when medical schools agreed to embargo academic records until 
the beginning of the fourth year.92 As described in Part II, ante, 
this agreement resulted in medical students being selected for 
residency at the most appropriate time in the cycle, i.e., during 
the fourth year of studies. 
Moreover, today's medical students' search for residency 
differs from the search of the students of the 1940s in one im-
portant aspect. Today, many residency programs require that 
students submit the results of the first in a series of licensing 
exams, the United States Medical Licensing Exam, the USMLE, 
Step I, with their application.93 This exam was not administered 
in the 1940s.94 The majority of today's students take the exam 
between their second and third year,95 as the exam tests the sub-
jects taught during the first two years.96 Because the score on 
the exam often determines competitiveness for a residency slot97 
and because the exam cannot be retaken once passed,98 students 
92 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
93 See UNIV. OF 1LL.-CHICAGO, COLL. OF MED., OFFICE OF STUDENT AFFAIRS CAREER 
PLAN. RESOURCES, Residency Application Process, available at http://www.uic.edu/depts/ 
mcam/osa/careers/residency/ResComponents2005.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) 
("Step I scores are an important tool used by many programs to screen applicants for 
residency internews and provide a basis for comparison. The more competitive the 
program, the higher the Step I score required."). 
94 The USMLE was introduced in 1994. See Gregory Dolin, Licensing Health Care 
Professionals: Has the United States Outlived the Need for Medical Licensure?, 2 GEO. J. L. & 
PUB. POL'y 315,319 (2004). 
95 See, e.g., UNIV. OF N. C., SCH. OF MED., Policy for Completion of the USMLE Step 1 & 
2 Exams, available at http://www.med.unc.edu/curriculum/Administration/usmle.htm 
(last visited May 10, 2004). ("Typically, students are expected to take Step I for the first 
time in Mayor June following the completion of the second year."); UNIV. OF TEX.-
SOUTHWESTERN, SCH. OF MED., Catalog, Second Year: Medical School Curriculum, available at 
http://www8.utsouthwestern.edu/utsw/ cda/ deptI37886/files/137919.html (last vis-
ited May 10, 2004) ("Students will usually take the U.S. Medical Licensing Examination 
Step I at the conclusion of the second year.") 
96 See U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION, STEP 1 Content Outline, available at 
http://www.usmle.org/stepl/intro.htm. ("The test is designed to measure basic sci-
ence knowledge.") 
97 See supra note 93. 
98 See U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION, 2004 Bulletin, Eligibility, available at 
http://www.usmle.org/bulletin/2004/eligibility.htm. (last visited May 10, 2004) ("If 
you pass a Step, you are not allowed to retake it .... ") 
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are unlikely to attempt to take it before the end of their second 
year. The results of the exam are usually available a month 
later.99 Thus, at the very least, residency programs would not 
recruit until the Step I results become available, i.e., somewhere 
in the middle of the third year, at the earliest. 
The next argument advanced by the proponents of the 
NRMP suggests that the Match allows students to compete on 
merits, rather than on connections. IOO To begin with, it is a 
rather dubious proposition. It should be beyond dispute that an 
applicant whose family member is, for example, a senior staff 
member or a large donor to a given institution is in a better 
position than a no-name applicant whether with or without the 
Match. It should also be beyond dispute that a program director 
is no more likely to deny a favor to his superior, benefactor, or 
college buddy in the presence of a Match system than in the 
absence thereof. Of course, the rankings are not released,lol but 
if the connected applicant did not match in the desired place, it 
would become clear quite quickly that the program director re-
fused to rank said applicant high enough. Whatever repercus-
sions such program director would face in an open market 
system for refusing to accommodate his superior, benefactor, or 
college buddy, are present in the Match system as well. The only 
difference is that in the latter system the repercussions are 
delayed until the Match Day. Thus, the argument that the 
Match eliminates (or even mitigates) the influence peddling in 
the residency selection process is wholly without merit. 
The Match has few, if any, procompetitive effects. The po-
tential justifications advanced by the NRMP do not withstand 
scrutiny. However, even if the claims asserted by the NRMP are 
correct, the procompetitive effects are so minor that they do not 
justify the existence of the Match. It is to this argument that the 
article now turns. 
99 U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION, 2004 Bulletin, Scaring and Score Reporting, 
available at http://www.usmle.org/bulletin/2004/scoring.hun. (last visited May 10, 
2004) ("Step results typically have been available in time to mail your report within 
three to four weeks after your test date".) 
100 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
101 See NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, Frequently Asked Questions about the 
NRMP's Interactive Web Site, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/faq/us_se-
niorsjaq.html (last visited May 10,2004) (specifying that the applicant is "the only one, 
other than the NRMP staff, who can access your rank order list"). 
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IV. The Legal Analysis of the Match 
As mentioned previously, Congress has enacted legislation 
that essentially provides the NRMP a blanket exemption from 
antitrust liability. The legislation does not even permit the fact 
that a residency program participates in the Match to be used as 
evidence in court. 102 Thus, it is likely that the law as it currendy 
stands would allow the NRMP to escape liability.103 However, be-
cause this author believes that the predicate for congressional 
action is incorrect (i. e., that the Match is a "highly efficient, pro-
competitive ... process"), 104 it is worth analyzing how the NRMP 
would have fared under the traditional antitrust jurisprudence. 
This part explores the legal landscape facing the NRMP as it 
stood before the enactment of the Pension Funding Equity Act 
of 2004.105 
The legal framework under which the Match is to be ana-
lyzed is not crystal clear because, as explained above, the Match 
does not directly set prices. However, as argued in Part lILA, ante, 
the Match does empower participants to set prices. The courts 
have found certain behavior anti-competitive even if it does not 
directly affect prices. 106 
For example, in Professional Engineers,107 the Supreme Court 
required the association of engineers to affirmatively defend an 
ethics rule prohibiting members from discussing fees with pro-
spective customers prior to being selected for a project because 
the agreement "impede[d] the ordinary give and take of the 
market place."108 Similarly, in Indiana Dentists,J09 the Court 
ruled that the withholding of X-rays from patients' insurers was 
"likely enough to disrupt the proper functioning of the price-
setting mechanism of the market that it may be condemned 
even absent proof that it resulted in higher prices or ... the 
102 Pension Funding Equity Act, supra note 6, § 207(b) (2). ("Evidence of [partici-
pating in any matching program] shall not be admissible in Federal court to support 
any claim or action alleging a violation of the antitmst laws.") 
103 The District Court has already so mled. See supra note 2. 
104 
105 Pension Funding Equity Act, supra note 6. 
106 See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Nat'l Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
107 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
108 [d. at 692. 
109 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
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purchase of higher priced services, than would occur in its ab-
sence."IIO The key question, therefore, is not whether the Match 
mechanism actually sets prices, but whether the Match "dis-
rupt[s] the proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism 
of the market. "111 
First and foremost, under traditional antitrust jurispru-
dence, the court must determine whether the arrangement af-
fects commerce. In the present case, the defendants have 
argued that residency training is not commerce and that re-
sidents are not employees.1l2 Instead, the defendants contend 
that residency training is education and residents are students 
who learn "hands-on."1l3 This argument should be quickly re-
jected by the courts. Hospitals and residents exchange money 
for services. Hospitals pay residents a salary (or provide them 
with a stipend, to use NRMP's terminology1l4) in exchange for 
the services residents perform in treating patients. In addition 
to receiving monetary compensation, the residents also receive 
an educational benefit, the mere receipt of which cannot possi-
bly remove the resident-hospital relationship outside the scope 
of commercial activity. As far back as 1975, the Supreme Court 
has emphatically stated that "the exchange of [] a service for 
money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that 
word."115 Even if one agrees with the defendants' view that resi-
dency training is education and education only, one still would 
have to conclude that the activity is commercial. In U.S. v. Brown 
University,116 the Third Circuit held that educational institutions 
such as universities engage in commerce, and thus fall under the 
antitrust laws, when they "sell" their education to the students,u7 
110 ld. at 461·62. 
111 ld. 
112 Jung v. AAMC, Motion of Defendant ACGME to Dismiss at 2. The motion was 
joined by four hospital defendants. See opinion on Motions to Dismiss at 84, n.35 (Feb. 11, 
2004). 
113 See, e.g., Jordan J. Cohen, An Unqualified Victory, available at http:// 
www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/sept04/word.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). 
("[O]ur residents are primarily learners, not employees") 
114 See generally Save the Match FAQ, available at http://savethemath.org/faq/ 
all.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). Note that throughout the website the word "salary" is 
not used. Instead, compensation is referred to as a "stipend." 
115 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1975). 
116 Broom Univ. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
117 ld. at 666. (" [T]he payment of tuition in return for educational services consti-
tutes commerce.") 
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The teaching hospitals certainly engage in commerce at least to 
the extent the universities do. 
Having resolved the preliminary question of the applicabil-
ity of antitrust laws, the next part of the examination is what 
standards the court is to utilize in adjudicating the case against 
the NRMP. The Match is an arrangement made by and for pro-
fessionals, ostensibly for the benefit of the profession. The Su-
preme Court has said on several occasions that judgments of the 
professionals with respect to their profession merit a more differ-
ential review than most other contracts or combinations. 1 IS 
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the courts will conduct any-
thing less than a full review that would balance anticompetitive 
and procompetitive effects. 1l9 Utilizing the "rule of reason" bal-
ancing test approach, the court will have to determine whether 
the benefits that the Match provides justifY its existence. 120 
118 See, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 475 U.S. at 458-59; Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 
at 696; Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-789, n.17. 
119 See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 670. ("The [Supreme] Court in 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975), coun-
seled against applying traditional antitrust rules outside of conventional business 
contexts.") 
120 The "rule of reason" comes from the 1911 Supreme Court case Standard Oil Co. 
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Although the Sherman Act states that every agree-
ment in restraint of trade is unlawful, in certain situations that would lead to absurd 
results (e.g., attorneys forming a partnerships and agreeing not to compete against 
themselves would technically be an agreement in restraint of trade and therefore not 
permitted under the literal reading of the Sherman Act). In Standard Oil, however, the 
Supreme Court clarified that only those agreements that are unreasonable will be held to 
be illegal. Thus, agreements in restraint of trade could be defended if some reasonable 
purpose ,,-as offered. Nonetheless, some agreements (e.g., outright price-fixing) have 
been held to be so inherently unreasonable that no explanation would be sufficient to 
justify them. See United States v. Topco Assocs.,405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) ("v"hile the 
Court has utilized the 'rule of reason' in evaluating the legality of most restraints al-
leged to be violative of the Sherman Act, it has also developed the doctrine that certain 
business relationships are per se violations of the Act without regard to a consideration 
of their reasonableness .... It is only after considerable experience with certain busi-
ness relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.") 
Because of their unique status, professions have been treated more deferentially by 
the Supreme Court. Agreements within professions arc almost always subject to the 
"rule of reason," as opposed to "per se" analysis because the Court allows for the possi-
bility that the obligations of the profession to those they serve may mandate arrange-
ments inappropriate to other business ventures. See, e.g., Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17 
("The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business 
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sher-
man Act. . . . The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may 
require t1lat a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the 
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.") Thus, the Match, as an ar-
rangement by the medical profession could (under the traditional antitrust analysis) 
only be deemed illegal if it is proven that the it is an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
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Although this article suggests that there are indeed no ben-
efits to the Match and the benefits claimed by its proponents are 
illusory, for the purposes of the discussion below, the author as-
sumes that the benefits as put forth by the NRMP do exist. 
Courts have consistently held that social welfare concerns 
cannot justify restraints on competition. 121 This legal rule 
should eliminate NRMP's third and fourth justification. 122 The 
epitome of the social benefit justification is competition based 
on merit and the ability to rank programs according to true pref-
erences. These justifications, therefore, cannot serve as a coun-
terweight to the costs that the Match imposes on the applicants. 
We are thus left with the justifications that the Match allows stu-
dents to (1) "[c]ompletely and thoroughly evaluate each pro-
gram they are considering without the pressure of early 
'exploding offers;'" and (2) "[d]elay making their final decisions 
until after they've had more clinical experience on which to base 
their choices."123 These justifications are arguably economic be-
cause they promote more informed consumer choice. 
In evaluating whether the reasons advanced by the propo-
nent of a restraint on trade are sufficient to justify the restraint, 
the court must decide "whether the challenged agreement is 
necessary to achieve its purported goals."124 Using this test, it 
should be quite clear, given the discussion ante, that the Match is 
completely unnecessary to achieve the NRMP's second goal (i.e., 
allowing the students to "[d]elay making their final decisions un-
til after they've had more clinical experience"125). An agree-
ment to withhold students' data prior to a certain date during or 
at the end of the third year is sufficient to meet this goal. 126 This 
embargo would be easier to maintain than in the past because of 
For a comprehensive discussion on the rule of reason see Phillip Areeda, The Rule 
of Reason-A Catechism on Competition, PiS ANTITRUST LJ. 571 (1986). 
121 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669 citing Proj'IEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695; Ind. Dentists, 476 
U.S. at 463 ("A restraim on competition cannot be justified solely on the basis of social 
welfare concerns.") 
122 As indicated previously, NRMP's fifth contention is that with the Match students 
can "[t]ry to get into the best programs in the specialty they wish to practice, without 
prejudicing their ability to secure a position at one of their 'safe' choices." This argu-
mem is merely a repetition of the first one and does not warrant a separate discussion. 
See supra note 87. 
123 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
124 Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 678. 
125 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
I ~6 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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the presence of an additional backslide stopper, the USMLE 
Step I.127 
Nor does the NRMP's first concern justify the existence of 
the Match. To battle that problem, an agreement to keep the 
offers open for a given period, similar to the one employed by 
the National Association for Law Placement, should be suffi-
cient. 128 The expected counter-argument would be that such a 
system would fail just like it did in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
That argument should be rejected because the residency market 
in the 1940s is simply not analogous to the residency market to-
day. For example, in the 1940s, residency was optional and to-
day it is required. 129 Thus, hospitals should be less likely to 
attempt to lock-in students because, unlike the 1940s, students 
may not choose to forgo post-graduate training. In any event, 
given the fact that exploding offers have not created a problem 
in the market for physicians post-residency (whether seeking a 
fellowship or entering the market as a practitioner), nor in the 
market for students seeking to enter medical schools even in the 
absence of a comparable matching mechanism,130 it should 
stand to reason that the Match is wholly unnecessary to protect 
medical students from the problem of exploding offers. Moreo-
ver, even if the Match is necessary to prevent exploding offers, 
the benefit obtained does not outweigh the anti-competitive ef-
fects of the system. 
After examining the necessity of the Match to achieve the 
purported pro-competitive benefits, the courts should conclude 
that the Match is too broad a restraint to justify the advantages it 
127 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. 
128 See NAT'L Assoc. OF L. PLACEMENT, Principles and Standards § IV.F.1, available at 
http://www.nalp.org/pands/pands.htm (last visited May 10, 2004) ("Employers should 
give candidates a reasonable period of time to consider offers of employment and 
should avoid conduct that subjects candidates La undue pressure to accept."). NALP 
guidelines pro~ide specific regulations for specific situations and specify how long the 
offers should be kept open, and conversely specify how many offers an applicant is 
allowed to hold at a given time. See id. § V. 
129 See, e.g., N. C. Mm. Bo., A Brief History of the North Carolina Medical Board: 1859-
2000 available at http://www.ncmedboard.org/brdhst.htm (last visited May 5, 2004). 
("Prior to 1977, applicants for a license were not required to have post-graduate medi-
cal education or training. With an amendment to the Medical Practice Act at that time, 
applicants for a full license were required to have at least one year of post-graduate 
training. Then, in 1985, the law was modified to require three years of post-graduate 
training for foreign medical graduates.") 
130 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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brings.I~1 Alternatively, the benefits of the Match do not out-
weigh the costs that the system imposes. 
V. The Alternative Solutions 
If the current Match mechanism for securing a residency 
position is to disappear, an alternative system is needed to take 
its place. The alternatives can be broadly described as falling 
into three categories: (1) a voluntary matching system, (2) a 
binding multiple matching system, and (3) the free market sys-
tem. The first system operates much like today's Match, but 
both students and programs are able to withdraw at any time and 
there is no obligation to honor the match if it occurs. The sec-
ond system also operates similar to the present-day Match, ex-
cept that a student can be matched into multiple locations and 
then can choose and bargain with the programs. The third op-
tion is self-explanatory. This part will discuss each option in 
turn. 
A. A Voluntary Match 
One of the solutions proposed by the plaintiffs in Jung is to 
make the Match voluntary.132 A voluntary approach would keep 
most of the features of the Match in place, but would allow stu-
dents to opt out of the program at any point. 133 The same opt-
out option would exist for the residency programs. I34 This solu-
tion potentially solves the main problem with the Match, for it 
would allow students to receive multiple offers and to evaluate 
them. Although this solution may well pass the antitrust scru-
tiny, it is unsatisfactory. 
Whether the Match is mandatory or voluntary, the transac-
tion costs associated with running the program remain. I3s Hos-
131 This author remains convinced that the Match indeed brings no benefits. To 
the extent however. that some advantages flow from the arrangement, these advantages 
are insufficient to justify the restraint. 
132 SeeJung v. AAMC, Plaintiffs First Supplemental Answer to Defendants' Common Inter-
rogatory Relating to Class Certification at 2, available at http://residentcase.com/03_so1u-
tions_alternatives/pdf/rnterrogatory_Answer.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004); see also, 
The "Voluntary Match, » Proposed Improvemmt to the Currmt National Residency Matching Pro-
gram, available at http://residentcase.com/03_solutions_alternatives/pdf/The_ Volun-
tary_Match.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter The Voluntary Match]. 
133 See 171e Voluntary Match, supra note 132, at 3. 
134 [d. at 2. 
13!; See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
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pitals, if they remain committed to this new mechanism, would 
still interview more students than necessary136 and students 
would again have to in many cases put the planning of their fu-
ture life on hold. 137 
The most fundamental problem with a voluntary Match, 
however, is that it may not be feasible. Because of certain trans-
actional costs associated with running the Match, it may become 
too costly to run a program in which very few participants are 
bound. The long-term survival of any voluntary matching 
scheme is doubtful because of the rather high costs and rather 
uncertain result.138 For these reasons, a voluntary Match is not 
the appropriate solution. 
B. A Binding Multiple Match 
Yet another solution was proposed by Ms. Melinda Creas-
man. 139 Ms. Creasman argues for a system indistinguishable 
from the one the NRMP is currently running, except for the fact 
that on the Match Day, a student would match to two hospi-
tals. 140 Unfortunately, this proposal only barely addresses the 
problems with the current Match while keeping the transac-
tional costs. Further, the proposal may be completely 
unworkable. 
First, the multiple binding match system still limits the ap-
plicants to a given number of matches. 141 This in turn limits 
their ability to truly weigh all possible options. While there is 
little dispute that a choice between two programs is better than 
no choice at all, no arrangement should arbitrarily limit the 
choices of graduating medical students in the U.S .. 
Additionally, any systematic Match system (single or multi-
1~6 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra notes 81-83 and accompan)~ng text. 
138 See Clark, supra note 78, at 1764 (arguing that "a matching system is bound to 
disintegrate unless virtually all programs with positions to offer participate"). Oark pro-
vides several examples of matching programs that failed because of lack of participa-
tion. See also Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions 
Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 992 (1994) (describing 
how matching systems that lack commitment unravel). 
1~9 See Creasman, supra note 33. 
140 Jd. at 1473-75. 
141 Ms. Creasman proposes a maximum of two matches. This of course prevents 
the applicant who could have gotten three or more offers from truly exercising his own 
marketability. 
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pie) retains the rather high transaction costs. 142 Indeed, the 
transaction costs may be increased because hospitals would need 
to interview twice as many candidates as they interview under the 
current system, with no particular assurance that their efforts will 
result in the desired candidates accepting their offer. 
In a multiple match system, the legal analysis and the bal-
ancing of interests remain the same as in the current system. If 
it is accepted that the current Match provides no benefits, or 
that the benefits it provides do not justifY the restraints, one 
must conclude the same with respect to the multiple match 
system. 
Finally, a multiple match system may prove to be completely 
unworkable. As previously stated, any program that enrolls re-
sidents must be accredited by the ACGME.143 One of the major 
criteria for ACGME accreditation is "the adequacy of resources 
for resident education such as quality and volume of patients 
and related clinical material available for education, faculty-resi-
dent ratio, institutional funding, and the quality of faculty teach-
ing."144 Accordingly, a program is accredited to train only a 
certain number of residents. 145 Under the ACGME rules, a resi-
dency program cannot hire residents in excess of its accredited 
capacity.146 A multiple match system may result in an over-en-
rollment of residents in some programs and an under-enroll-
ment in others. In a multiple match system, a student may 
receive two (or any other number larger than one) offers. Pre-
sumably, then a given hospital must extend twice as many offers, 
given that any student offered a position can enroll in the sec-
ond program. However, if the Match results are binding, there 
is nothing to prevent all individuals to whom the hospital has 
extended the offer from taking it. Thus, a hospital may end up 
with up to twice (or thrice, depending on the number of multi-
ple matches) residents as it can enroll under the ACGME guide-
lines. Another hospital may end up with no residents at all. This 
142 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
144 ACGME. Common Program Requirements § II.B, available at http://\\ww.acgme. 
org/DutyHours/ dUlyHoursCommonPR.asp (last visited May 10, 2004). 
145 ld. ("A[] R[esidency] R[eview] C[ommiuee] may approve the number of re-
sidents based upon established wriuen criteria."). 
146 See id. 
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problem may be able to be solved by hospitals ranking a number 
of students not to exceed its allotted slots. The hospital would 
then wait for the Match results and acceptances, and fill 
whatever slots remain through either the Scramble or a second-
round Match. This procedure seems to be quite cumbersome 
and unwarranted given the rather minimal improvement it 
would have over the status quo. 
C. A Free Market System 
A free market system of applying for and obtaining resi-
dency positions solves the problems discussed ante. In this sys-
tem, a student can receive any number of offers and can use 
them to negotiate the best contract possible. A student can also 
attempt to obtain a coveted position by underbidding other stu-
dents. Should the hospital be more interested in saving money 
than in recruiting the most prestigious students, it may well 
choose to hire an individual who is willing to work at a lower 
compensation rate. Thus, both the hospitals and the students 
would be able to engage in the ordinary give and take of the 
market place.147 
Two problems exist with a completely open free market sys-
tem. The first problem is the forward creep of the appointment 
date. The second problem is the dilemma of exploding offers. 
Both of these problems can be resolved by agreements that 
would limit the dates of entry into the market place and promul-
gate rules for open offers. 
In order to prevent the forward creep of the appointment 
date, all that is needed is an agreement similar to the one 
reached by medical schools in 1945148 or an agreement similar 
to the one currently utilized in the federal judicial law clerk se-
lection process. 149 This should resolve any concerns about the 
forward creep of the appointment date and would allow students 
to fully sample various specialties during their third year prior to 
making a decision about their career. 
147 Prof!. Eng'rs., 435 U.S. at 692. 
148 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
149 See Summary of Law Clerk Hiring Plan for 2004, available at http://www.cadc.us-
courts. gOY /bin/Lawclerk/Lawckerkpdf/ Summary _oCthe_PlanJor _2004. pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 6, 2004) (specifying that the process is not to begin earlier than a certain 
date). 
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The problem of exploding offers mayor may not be a real 
problem. This article has already discussed that exploding offers 
do not plague medical school or fellowship admission 
processes.150 There is no particular reason, therefore, to believe 
that exploding offers would return to the residency selection 
process. Further, the very premise that the search for residency 
employment should operate under different terms than the 
search for any other employment is questionable. 
If, however, one believes that exploding offers are problem-
atic and should be eliminated, a rule could be promulgated 
(perhaps as a part of ACGME accreditation standards, to make 
it enforceable) requiring hospitals to keep any extended offer 
open for some reasonable period of time, for example five days. 
Such a rule would allay any concerns regarding exploding offers. 
The only remaining question is whether the above proposed 
rules would pass judicial muster. 151 After all, these rules also re-
strict trade insofar as they do not allow the market participants 
to engage in negotiations at such time as they deem fit and to 
make such offers as they seem appropriate. However, it is likely 
that these rules would indeed survive antitrust scrutiny. As the 
Supreme Court has stated" [t] he true test of legality is whether 
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may sup-
press or even destroy competition."152 Because the embargo 
rule is likely to promote economic efficiency by providing stu-
dents with additional information before they make their 
choices regarding specialty, it is likely to be upheld. The same is 
true with respect to the open offer rule. The rule would pro-
mote competition by allowing students to entertain multiple 
offers. 
Thus, a free market scheme limited only by the rules regu-
lating the timing of recruiting and the continuous availability of 
offers made would provide the best system for students and hos-
pitals to negotiate conditions of employment while avoiding the 
pitfalls of the pre-Match era. 
150 See supra, Part UtA. 
151 [n light of the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, any set of matching or non-
matching rules would likely pass judicial muster. This question, however, is whether 
under traditional antitrust theory the proposed rules would survive. 
152 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
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VI. Conclusion 
The Match system run by the NRMP started out as an at-
tempt to bring order to medical students' frustrating experience 
of attempting to secure residency positions. Over the years, how-
ever, the Match has become so restrictive as to limit students' 
choice and ability to obtain the best deal for the hard work they 
provide. Congress erred when it declared the Match to be pro-
competitive and efficient and should reconsider its conclusion 
on these issues. 
The time has come to abandon the Match and to allow stu-
dents to engage in true negotiations with the potential employ-
ers. Any attempt to resuscitate the Match by restructuring it will 
only mask the problem without providing any real benefits. The 
time has come to let the Match die and not attempt any heroic 
measures to save it. The time has come to recognize that the 
market for medical residencies should be treated like any other 
employment market. 
